It has come to my attention that the new FLOG™ has several really creative ways of looking bad on different browsers and with different text sizes.
Sorry. This will be ironed out shortly, and in the meantime, I assure you I won't say anything very interesting.
Click here and decide for yourself:
John Edwards: successful trial lawyer or one-time leader of "Sunshine Band" cult?
Either way, one thing is certain: he is a millworker's son.
Yeah, so, this is it. I will be here now.
(Witty rejoinder note: if a fuzzy-headed spiritualist tells you to "Be here now," say: "I don't have much of a choice, do I?")
The appearance is far from finalized. It's so crisp and clean that I'm not sure I'm comfortable yet. I don't want to live in a museum. So I'm going to try to make it a bit uglier, so that it looks like it was designed by a guy who learned all his HTML in 1998 by stealing it from other websites. (Meaning me.)
This FLOG™ will be the FLOG™ whenever possible, but I'm at the mercy of my site host, who is trying to get into grad school and may unplug the server sometime this summer to move to Harvard or some other such fancy-pants institution. During such moments, I'll have to temporarily rev up the old FLOG™ as a stop-gap, so don't erase that bookmark or "favorite" or whatever you call them. I promise you, when the time comes you will absolutely be the third person to know about it.
Okay!
By the way, that entry below is excerpted from a brief I have to turn in next week, so if you spot any typos, let me know. Thank you.
Summary judgment can�t be granted if a genuine issue of material fact exists, meaning a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Judge Hankey admitted in the opinion below that a �legitimate factual dispute� existed as to Mrs. Marsh�s motivations, but concluded that the issue was not material because the court refused to recognize the good-faith vicarious consent exception. R. 20. However, the vicarious consent exception stands undisputed in the federal circuits, and we respectfully urge its recognition by this Court. Wagner v. Wagner, 64 F. Supp. 2d 895, 901 (D. Minn. 1999).
Under the vicarious consent exception, a parent may consent on behalf of a minor child, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. � 2511(2)(d), to intercept the minor child�s telephone conversations when the parent has a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for believing that it is necessary and in the best interest of the child. Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F.Supp. 1535, 1544 (D.Utah 1993). In Campbell v. Price, the court found that a parent could vicariously consent to an interception after observing his child acting sullen and crying after speaking with her mother on the telephone. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 (E.D. Ark. 1998). The father could not get his daughter to talk about what was bothering her, so he intercepted several telephone calls. Id.
As with the father in Campbell, Mrs. Marsh observed Stanley acting unusual and upset after speaking with Mr. Marsh, and she was unable to elicit from him what was bothering him. R. 5-6. The Respondent wrongly claims that Mrs. Marsh was motivated by a desire to collect information for use in a divorce, and so the opinion below rightly acknowledged that a genuine issue of fact was present. A reasonable juror could conclude that Ms. Marsh intercepted Stanley�s telephone conversations because of a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that it was necessary and in Stanley�s best interest, if this Court recognizes the indisputably accepted vicarious consent doctrine.